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Economic and Social Rights: Reflection to
Celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the
Declaration of Human Rights
STEVE KAHANOVITZ*

It was an honor to be gathered with the Maryland Law
Symposium‘s audience, whose members, in a whole range of both
individual and collective ways, have played an enormous role in the
development and implementation of human rights throughout the
world. In the brief space that this short essay allows, I am going to
try to explain the developments in respect of socio-economic rights,
particularly the right of access to housing in South Africa, and reach
a conclusion.
I work at the Legal Resources Centre.1 I have had the honor of
leading it and some of its offices at different stages. My personal
reflection stems from seeing houses often destroyed by an apartheid
state, the enactment of the Constitution, the initial cases where we
nervously litigated on socio-economic rights, and now the continued
enforcement and interpretation of our Bill of Rights. In a country
where unemployment and poverty are the most striking characteristics, and in a city where more than 400,000 people live in shacks,
my reflection here is to set out briefly the manner in which the
realization of socio-economic rights, as contained in the Constitution,
can deliver a better life for all in the country; ensure that there is
substantive equality before the law; and, in the words of the Preamble
to the Constitution, ―improve the quality of life of all citizens and
free the potential of each person.‖

* Attorney, Legal Resources Centre, Cape Town, South Africa.
1. More information about this organization is available at http://www.lrc.org.za/About.
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My job primarily is to ensure that people who often would not be
able to easily get access to lawyers enjoy what the Constitution
provides. We seek to ensure that, as provided for in section 7(2) of
the Constitution, the South African state strives to ―respect, protect,
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights;‖ the constitution
thus is intentioned to encourage transformation.2
How do we capture what clients often say about rights? I think, as
Arthur Chaskalson pointed out during his opening speech,3 clients
often know that their rights have been infringed. They come and see
us as lawyers, not to tell them that their rights have been infringed,
but to help them understand what is happening and to seek remedies.
And under South Africa‘s apartheid system, there were very few
remedies. We grappled with the law; we looked for gaps as we
interpreted statutes. Due to the influence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the adoption of our new South African
Constitution, there are now remedies available in our courts, and
hopefully our courts will continue to order them. Our state needs to
create conditions in which poor communities are able to grapple, to
mediate, and to negotiate on the basis of their rights, and if we are not
able to achieve that—to go to court and actually ensure that there is a
way in which their rights are respected, protected, promoted, and
fulfilled—then we have not fulfilled what our Constitution provides.
On the day this symposium began, a letter written by the Centre on
Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) was delivered to the Mayor
of Durban, a city committed to the fulfillment of constitutional rights.
COHRE works very closely with the social movement Abahlali
baseMjondolo in Durban, which now represents thousands of homeless people in one of the fastest growing social movements in South
Africa. In the letter, COHRE writes:
COHRE recently learnt of the threatened forced relocation
of shack-dwellers in Siyanda in KwaMashu, to make way for
the construction of a freeway in the area. According to a press
statement by the newly-formed Siyanda branch of Abahlali
baseMjondolo, at least 50 shacks have been demolished this
year in the area by the eThekwini Municipality without notice,
a court order or the provision of alternative accommodation.
2. See, e.g., Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Envtl. Affairs & Tourism 2004 (4) SA 490
(CC) paras. 74, 76 (S. Afr.).
3. Arthur Chaskalson, Dignity and Justice for All, 24 MD. J. INT‘L L. 24 (2009).
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COHRE has learnt that eThekwini Municipality promised that
all those displaced by the new MR-577 freeway would be
moved to newly-constructed houses in the Kulula Housing
Project. Siyanda residents have now been informed that an
unspecified number of families will be moved to eNtuzuma
and placed in ‗transit camps,‘ which consist of governmentbuilt shacks or temporary structures, ordinarily used for emergency housing. As eNtuzuma is further on the periphery of the
city, transport costs will be much higher for families as they
will be further from jobs and schools. At the same time, the
Municipality has reportedly decided to move families from
other areas like Umlazi and Lamontville, who are not affected
by the freeway construction, into the newly constructed Kulula
houses. This has understandably caused much confusion
within the community, and the situation is extremely tense at
present.4
Now, none of that is particularly surprising in a rapidly urbanizing
environment. None of it is particularly surprising in South Africa.
The question that we need to ask is not why it is happening, but
rather, whether and to what extent the government‘s carrying out, and
people affected by, evictions and relocations are going to be informed
and governed by the Constitution? Furthermore, to what extent do
those most prejudiced accept that the Constitution will protect,
respect, promote, and fulfil their rights, and that they will not have to
face a situation where they feel so unprotected by the Constitution
that letters like COHRE‘s have to be written on a daily basis.
THE DECLARATION AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION‘S BILL
OF RIGHTS
The South African people held their first democratic election on
April 27, 1994. Legislatively, it was preceded by Act 200 of 1993—
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa—that enshrined
South Africa‘s first Bill of Rights. It also provided for a whole range
of transitional mechanisms and the creation of a Constitutional
Assembly, which was to be the engine room for the drafting of South
Africa‘s first democratically accepted constitution.
4. Letter from Salih Booker, Executive Director, Centre on Housing Rights and
Evictions, to Obed Mlaba, Mayor, Durban, South Africa (Oct. 24, 2008), available at
http://www.abahlali.org/node/4266.
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (―Declaration‖),
signed sixty years ago and celebrated here at this symposium, has its
roots in the U.N. Charter, which was signed on June 26, 1945.
Notably, South Africa was one of the eight abstentions when fortyeight nations approved the Declaration. On June 26, 1955, exactly
ten years after the signing of the U.N. Charter and seven years into
the apartheid state, the Freedom Charter was signed in South Africa
by those struggling against apartheid. The origins of South Africa‘s
Bill of Rights can be seen in it, and, significantly, it contains a range
of aspirations in regard to socio-economic issues that today have been
enshrined in our Constitution as socio-economic rights.5 In Mark
Gevisser‘s biography of Thabo Mbeki, he writes of a recognition
within the African National Congress to move the Freedom Charter
from the stage of being a Charter to ensuring that there could be a
programmatic enshrinement of the rights referred to in the Charter—
and perhaps that was one of the beginning points of ensuring that the
South African Constitution eventually contained socio-economic
rights.6
The South African Constitution was subjected to extensive debate,
consultation, and thereafter certification7 by the Constitutional Court
to ensure that its provisions complied with the principles for the
Constitution which had been adopted as part of the transitional
process. It was only after the Constitutional Court had certified the
new Constitution that it became law as Act 108 of 1996.
The Constitution provides that in interpreting it, reference should
be made to international law. Section 233 of the Constitution
requires that ―when interpreting any legislation, every court must
prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is
consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation
that is inconsistent with international law.‖ Therefore, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenants (even the not-yetratified International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
5. The Freedom Charter‘s recognition of civil, political, and socio-economic rights
preceded the international Covenants by more than twenty years (in 1976, both the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) came into force). After the fall of the
apartheid regime, South Africa later signed both Covenants on October 3, 1994, but has
ratified only the ICCPR.
6. MARK GEVISSER, THABO MBEKI: THE DREAM DEFERRED (2007).
7. In re Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of S. Afr.,
1996, 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC) (S.Afr.) (certifying the final constitution).
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Rights) are key to the interpretation of our Bill of Rights. Chapter 2
of the South African Constitution provides for a Bill of Rights. Its
last clause, section 39, provides that:
1. When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or
forum
a. must promote the values that underlie an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom;
b. must consider international law; and
c. may consider foreign law.
Thus is set the constitutional and statutory basis for a solid
relationship between international human rights law and the South
African Constitution.
Following the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
subsequent development of the Covenants, we have regularly identified the socio-economic rights in our constitution as those dealing
with education, health, housing, and social welfare. The distinctions
at times are problematic, and our courts have emphasized the
indivisibility of all rights and the need to balance them.
The first Constitutional Court attempt to obtain definition in
respect of economic, social, and cultural rights was in the Soobramoney case, in which the Constitutional Court considered whether a
terminally ill diabetic was entitled to receive dialysis treatment at a
state hospital in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution
which entitle everyone to have access to health care services provided
by the state.8 As practitioners representing poor people, the judgment
quite honestly scared us: the defendant government had set out
extensively and in a detailed fashion the financial position regarding
KwaZulu hospitals and medicine, and we feared that in the future we
would land up dealing with these matters almost as accountants and
auditors rather than as defenders of constitutional rights.
SECTION 26 AND SOUTH AFRICA‘S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
HOUSING
In the housing field, the South African Constitution at section 26
provides that:
8. Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC)
(interpreting section 27 of the South African Constitution) (S. Afr.).
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1. Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
2. The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.
3. No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home
demolished, without an order of court made after considering
all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit
arbitrary evictions.9
The new democratically elected post-apartheid government was
particularly keen to ensure delivery of housing. In the first five years
of our democracy, various significant pieces of legislation were
enacted to realize the rights contained in section 26, including the
Housing Act,10 the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful
Occupation of Land Act,11 the Extension of Security of Tenure Act,12
and several others.
Private land owners and the government often evict poor people,
with the government often alleging it is for their own good and
necessary for development purposes. Millions of poor people, who
faced the brunt of eviction under the Prevention of Illegal Squatting
Act13 of the apartheid state, and who had often been evicted without
court order, could now rely on the housing provisions in the
Constitution and the new legislation that was being enforced.
Accordingly, a single mother, Mrs. Ross,14 came to us after
receiving an eviction notice, which we successfully challenged by
arguing that the court summons was defective as it had been issued
without the applicant even pleading the constitutionally required ―all
the relevant circumstances,‖ and was thus in violation of her section
26 rights under the Constitution.15
A gamut of cases followed in many of our provincial divisions of
9. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 26.
10. Housing Act 107 of 1997.
11. Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of
1998.
12. Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997.
13. Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951.
14. Ross v South Peninsula Municipality 2000 (1) SA 589 (C). Note that in later
subsequent matters, this judgment was correctly held by the Supreme Court of Appeal to
have been incorrect.
15. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 26(3) (―No one may be evicted from their home, or have their
home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.‖).
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the court. Conservative commentators regularly decried the judgments and stated that we were about to become like Zimbabwe (we
still hear that sometimes), that private property was not being
respected, etc.
Then came along the case which is now celebrated as the seminal
case on socio-economic rights—the Grootboom case.16 It inter alia
provided:
(1) that socio-economic rights are justiciable;
(2) that while the city of Cape Town had developed a plan for poor
people in respect of housing, as it did not make provision for those
most desperately in need, it did not pass constitutional muster; and
(3) that ‗reasonableness‘ was the key test for establishing whether
policy met constitutional muster. The Court did not accept (and at a
later stage outright rejected) the submission that it should develop a
concept of the core content of a right to assist in interpretation.
For our purposes in celebration of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, it is notable that the Court in Grootboom grappled
with the extent to which the ICESCR should be used as a ―guide to an
interpretation of section 26 [of the Constitution]‖:17
Section 39 of the Constitution obliges a court to consider
international law as a tool to interpretation of the Bill of
Rights. In Makwanyane Chaskalson P, in the context of
section 35(1) of the interim Constitution, said: ―. . . public
international law would include nonbinding as well as binding
law. They may both be used under the section as tools of
interpretation. International agreements and customary
international law accordingly provide a framework within
which [the Bill of Rights] can be evaluated and understood . . . .‖
....
The amici submitted that the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the Covenant) is of
significance in understanding the positive obligations created
by the socio-economic rights in the Constitution. . . .
....
The differences between the relevant provisions of the
Covenant and our Constitution are significant in determining
16. South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.).
17. Id. para. 28.
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the extent to which the provisions of the Covenant may be a
guide to an interpretation of section 26. These differences, in
so far as they relate to housing, are:
(a) The Covenant provides for a right to adequate housing
while section 26 provides for the right of access to
adequate housing.
(b) The Covenant obliges states parties to take appropriate
steps which must include legislation while the Constitution
obliges the South African state to take reasonable
legislative and other measures.18
The Court in Grootboom determined that concepts such as a state‘s
―minimum core obligation‖ to provide housing may play out
differently under the South African Constitution, and found the
analysis of the U.N. committee interpreting the Covenant ―helpful in
plumbing the meaning of ‗progressive realisation‘ [of the right to
housing] in the context of our Constitution.‖19
The housing area remains one of the most litigated and contested
areas in our law. We have seen since Grootboom several developments, and I will briefly try and explain them. Firstly, it has
increased procedural protections available to poor people. Secondly,
the rights first outlined in section 26 of the Constitution have now
developed much more substantive content. The substantive issues
that have generated the most comment are the rights to consultation20
and provision of alternative accommodation prior to eviction.21
Thirdly, in opposing evictions, the litigation has assisted in
developing an extended range of remedies available to poor people
including: in Fose (not a housing rights case), the Constitutional
Court held that ―appropriate relief‖ must mean an effective remedy
and therefore courts are not limited only to those remedies that
existed prior to the new Constitution, and could fashion new types of
remedies so as to enforce the Bill of Rights; 22 thereafter in the

18. Id. paras. 26–28 (quoting State v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para. 35 (S.
Afr.)) (first emphasis added) (first and second alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).
19. Id. paras. 33, 45.
20. See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC)
(S. Afr.); Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Beria Twp. v City of Johannesburg 2008 (3) SA 208
(CC) (S. Afr.).
21. See Port Elizabeth Municipality, (1) SA 217; Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, (3) SA
208.
22. Fose v Minister of Safety & Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) para. 69 (S. Afr.).
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Valhalla Park decision,23 use was made of structural interdicts;
Modderklip,24 which required compensation; and in Dada and
Others,25 in which the Court went so far as to order the local authority
to purchase property for the use of those living in it and facing
eviction. Thus we have seen, in a range of different cases, courts
grant declarators, or structural interdicts, or order damages, or the
rebuilding of unlawfully demolished structures, and more as they
develop these remedies.
Briefly stated, the owner and landlord of old now has to come to
terms with the fact that neither international nor domestic law will
allow apartheid-style evictions without court orders, as they took
place at the behest of security forces, and that in seeking the evictions
of persons who possibly are unlawfully occupying property, they
would of necessity and obligation have to apply to evict those not
wanting to leave by court order, which application would not be
granted simply on the basis of non-payment of rent, or illegality of
occupation.
In the course of these developments in our constitutional housing
law, there has been much reliance on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and on the Covenants. I have already pointed out how
the Court referred to the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights in the Grootboom matter,26 and has further done
so since then. In other matters dealing with socio-economic rights,
the following is also worthy of note.
In Jaftha v Schoeman,27 when the Court considered the constitutionality of a law permitting ―the sale in execution of peoples‘ homes
because they have not paid their debts, thereby removing their
security of tenure,‖28 the Court noted:
Although the concept of adequate housing was briefly
discussed in [Grootboom,] this Court has yet to consider it in
any detail. This subject has however been dealt with by the
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
23. City of Cape Town v Rudolph 2004 (5) SA (C) (S. Afr.).
24. President of the Republic of S. Afr. v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd. 2005 (5) SA 3
(CC) at 4 (S. Afr.).
25. Dada v Unlawful Occupiers of Portion 41, No. 05/16270, slip op. (WLD Feb. 15,
2008) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/48.pdf.
26. South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.).
27. 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) (S. Afr.).
28. Id. para. 1.
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Rights . . . in the context of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights . . . . In terms of section
39(1)(b) of the Constitution, this Court must consider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. Therefore,
guidance may be sought from international instruments that
have considered the meaning of adequate housing.29
The Court then referred to Article 11(1) of the Covenant, which
recognizes the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for
himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing, and
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.
The Court continued:
In its General Comment 4, the Committee, giving content to
article 11(1) of the Covenant, emphasised the need not to give
the right to housing a restrictive interpretation and to see it as
―the right to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity.‖
The position of the Committee reflects the view adopted by
this Court in Grootboom, that the right to dignity is inherently
linked with socio-economic rights. It is important, for the
purposes of this case, to point to the Committee‘s recognition
that ―the concept of adequacy is particularly significant in
relation to the right to housing.‖ While acknowledging that
adequacy ―is determined in part by social, economic, cultural,
climatic, ecological and other factors‖, it has identified
―certain aspects of the right that must be taken into account for
this purpose in any particular context.‖ Of relevance is the
focus on security of tenure. The Committee points out that
security of tenure takes many forms, not just ownership, but
that ―all persons should possess a degree of security of tenure
which guarantees legal protection against forced eviction,
harassment and other threats.‖30
In a subsequent matter—one in many ways equally important to
Grootboom—where the Court ordered the government to roll out
Neviropene to HIV-positive women,31 it again turned to international
law and noted in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign:
It was contended that section 27(1) of the Constitution
29. Id. para. 23 (footnotes omitted).
30. Id. para. 24 (footnotes omitted).
31. Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) para. 135 (S.
Afr.).
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establishes an individual right vested in everyone. This right,
so the contention went, has a minimum core to which every
person in need is entitled. The concept of ―minimum core‖
was developed by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which is charged with
monitoring the obligations undertaken by state parties to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. According to the Committee: ―a State party in which
any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential
foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter
and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima
facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant.
If the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to
establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely
deprived of its raison d’être. By the same token, it must be
noted that any assessment as to whether a State has discharged
its minimum core obligations must also take account of
resource constraints applying within the country concerned.
Article 2(1) obligates each State party to take the necessary
steps ‗to the maximum of its available resources‘. In order for
a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its
minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources it
must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all
resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a
matter of priority, those minimum obligations.‖32
The Court then reiterated a central holding of both Soobramoney
and Grootboom: that in considering an alleged constitutional
violation of socio-economic rights, judges should evaluate the
reasonableness of the state‘s policy rather than calibrate a minimum
core individual entitlement to socio-economic rights.33
These cases, all read together, demonstrate a very significant shift
in the power balance between those who have unfairly always been
able to own, occupy, and control property in South Africa to one
where even the law, notwithstanding provisions protecting private
property, recognizes the need to establish a far more equitable
arrangement.
In addition to what already appears in judgments, written arg32. Id. para. 26.
33. Id. paras. 29–39.
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uments in many cases now refer to international law, and in housing
cases we now often also rely on the general comments of the U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The recently
adopted Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate
Housing34 is already cited, so as to ensure that international law is
used.
The private property brigade has often viewed this with great
disdain. There have been various attempts to amend the key
legislation. The private law shift, however, is one which ensures that
rights are ―respected, protected, promoted and fulfilled, according to
the values of our constitution,‖ and most eminent of property
lawyers, Professor Van Der Walt, has been cited with approval by the
Court when he viewed the need:
to move away from a static, typically private law conceptualist
view of the Constitution as a guarantee of the status quo to a
dynamic typically public-law view of the Constitution as an
instrument for social change and transformation under the
auspices [and I would add ‗and control‘] of entrenched
constitutional values.35
Lastly, there were 6,000 people living on the railway line in
Khayelitsha who were facing eviction. They instructed their lawyers
not to oppose the eviction necessarily, but to reply that they were
willing to relocate on condition that there was an alternative place to
move. The 6,000 people on the railway line joined three spheres of
government to the litigation. They joined the local government,
provincial government, and the national government. And they said
that Grootboom held that there were particular responsibilities in
regard to the government making provision for those most
desperately in need. They were not concerned about which sphere of
government took on the responsibility, but that it was particularly
important that at least one of them took responsibility for ―if and
when‖ these 6,000 people were to move. The three spheres of
government pleaded, and a week before the case was to commence,
the case was settled.

34. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm‘n on Human Rights, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate
Standard of Living, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/18 (Feb. 5, 2007) (prepared by Miloon Kothari).
35. Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para. 16 (S.
Afr.) (alteration in original).
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The important aspect of that case is that now, three years after its
settlement, and in the last year, those 6,000 people have moved off
the railway line. They have used the policies that were developed
post-Grootboom, the policies in regard to urgent emergency housing
programs and the policies in regard to the upgrading of informal
settlements, as the bases for negotiating new residences five kilometers from where they were living. They have moved onto fully
serviced sites that have electricity and water connected. Thus there is
a noticeable shift from a situation before the Constitution came into
operation, and now, thankfully, people are able to mobilize and
organize around the rights developed and enforced in our courts, and
are actually able to ensure that there is no eviction or an agreed-upon
relocation. Hopefully for those who are asserting their rights in
Durban, as I quoted at the beginning of this reflection, similar type
provisions can operate.
CONCLUSION
The South African Constitution is unique in that it mandates
consideration of international law in interpreting our Bill of Rights.
This mandate has resulted in a careful consideration of the Declaration and its subsequent Covenants in over thirty cases so far in the
Court‘s short history. Several of these cases concern socio-economic
rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in particular has been a significant guide to the Court
as it struggles to give meaning to the ambitious guarantees of our
Constitution.

